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CHALLENGING THE ROLE OF ODA ON THE 2030 AGENDA 
The changeover from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), universal and indivisible, raises 
the question of what role official development assistance (ODA) plays in 
the new 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. The needs for sustain-
able investment are far in excess of ODA flows, and the political objec-
tives of “containment” that prevailed when development assistance first 
emerged are unquestionably obsolete. The purpose of this paper is to shed 
light on the rationales, motivations and objectives of ODA they appear 
in the official documents and websites of the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France and China, and to draw some specific implications for French ODA. 
PROFOUND DIFFERENCES IN HOW DONORS JUSTIFY THEIR ODA
“Indispensable” ODA focuses on stabilising fragile or failing Sates and on 
extreme poverty (United Kingdom, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation), 
“remedial” ODA is a means of building global policies able to “manage” 
or “repair” globalisation to the benefit of countries in the Global South 
(France, Germany). “Emancipatory” assistance offers recipient countries 
both an alternative to the conditional aid granted by the former colo-
nial powers, and the prospects of self-development supported by shared 
commercial interests (China).
AID NARRATIVES HARBOUR BLIND SPOTS
The expected role of external financing in achieving the objectives of 
stability and poverty alleviation for fragile and failing States (indispen-
sable assistance), the sustainability of funding through loans and the 
reality of their leverage effect (remedial assistance), and the environ-
mental sustainability of emerging development models (emancipatory 
assistance).
FRENCH ODA: DOVETAILING DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 
France, in its choice of bilateral allocation of ODA, only honours imper-
fectly its discourse. The ambition to offset the effects of globalization is 
reflected in the allocation for global public goods and climate, which has 
been growing strongly in recent years. On the other hand, the economic 
development of middle-income countries remains an objective privileged 
by France, which deserves to be clarified in the discourse. Spending on 
stability and social justice is lagging behind other issues.
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OBJECTIVE, METHOD AND 
MAIN RESULTS 
In pursuit of widely diverse goals such as 
containing Communist expansion, eradicating 
absolute poverty and decarbonizing electricity 
production, official development assistance 
(ODA) has now been available for more than half a 
century, targeting results that in terms of number 
and variety continue to raise the question of how 
useful it really is. What is the point of development 
aid in the world of Daesh, of the Panama Papers 
and of the 17 sustainable development objectives 
(SDGs)? 
The aim of this paper is to supply answers to this 
question, from the perspective of ODA contributors, 
who ask themselves a similar question in order to 
justify such aid. We do not adopt the beneficiaries’ 
viewpoint due to the lack of available survey data 
on the (perceived) effects of aid among the popu-
lations in recipient countries.1 We focus therefore 
on the official texts of the main European donors—
the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany, as 
well as communications from China and the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), whose grants 
have been recognized by the OECD’s Development 
Aid Committee since 2011. 
When reading these texts, we set about listing 
and categorising the rationales underlying ODA 
(Box 1 specifies what the term “aid” encompasses 
in this paper). We thereby managed to identify five 
main narratives. A second part of our work, we 
matched discourse and facts for the case of French 
ODA. For this, we compared the hypothetical 
1. Reference to the OECD report (2015a) cannot be used 
here since it involves the reasons for and impact of aid 
as perceived by the administration of recipient coun-
tries, with no referral to the direct users of ODA. 
allocation of French aid as can be surmised from 
the discourses justifying it with its actual alloca-
tion. To conclude, we attempted to identify the 
weaknesses and conditions for the success of ODA 
on the 2030 timeline. 
The following key points were identified by our 
research. 
1. Our reading of the national narratives shows 
that the Addis Ababa Agreement on development 
financing arrangements and the consensus around 
the goals expressed by the SDGs (Box 2) mask 
profound differences between the donors when 
it comes to the justification and the hallmarks of 
their ODA. Both the ways of justifying aid and ex-
plaining its rationales show more striking and ex-
plicit differences than initially anticipated. 
2. Despite similar goals and modalities—con-
flict management, poverty reduction, financing of 
global public goods—none of these bring the four 
donors together in such a way as to pave the way 
for other donors.
3. Aside from BMGF (and to some extent the 
UK), the conditions for successful ODA are not in-
trinsic to aid itself. By 2030, aid will be dependent 
on policies or initiatives that do not fall under the 
heading of ODA, as we know it today. Although 
this relationship has always existed to some de-
gree, such dependency has been amplified by the 
2030 Agenda and the fragile nature of contempo-
rary discourse on ODA.
4. These discourses contain a few blind spots 
that need to be enlightened. These include the 
role that funding (ODA and non-ODA) plays in 
achieving the targeted goals, the sustainability of 
this funding if subscribed as debt, and the public/
private sharing of responsibilities, especially when 
it comes to sharing risk. These blind spots are a 
second factor of weakness in the discourses justify-
ing ODA. 
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5. The 2030 Agenda currently under discussion 
is an agenda of financial offerings. This predomi-
nance of a discourse focusing on the “offering” 
stems from the accounting equation behind the 
Agenda’s stupendous financing needs—the tril-
lions to be found at all costs—whose terms date 
back to the first work of the Intergovernmental 
Committee of Experts on Sustainable Develop-
ment Financing. Vital to fixing the orders of mag-
nitude, the estimations of aggregate needs have 
the disadvantage of hiding, for the moment, the 
emergence of national preferences and the South’s 
narratives on the subject. This is a third weakness 
in the discourses on ODA. 
6. From the comparison between the French 
discourse and the allocation choices for bilateral 
ODA, it should be pointed out that the main is-
sues prioritised by France only partially reflect 
the discourse. The “economic development” issue 
received most funding over the period 2011–2014, 
accounting for around 30% of ODA commitments. 
The preponderant share for “economic develop-
ment” in this ODA allocation covers hefty commit-
ments in the road, rail and air transport sectors (for 
an average of 1 billion dollars over the period), for 
“production” (access to financing and banking ser-
vices, development of agricultural supply chains), 
“energy distribution” (power transmission lines) 
and “development and urban management” (im-
proving land tenure security or support for local 
authorities). 
7. Spending on peacekeeping and stability re-
mains low in the French bilateral ODA portfolio, 
as does, to a lesser extent, spending on “social jus-
tice”. However, these issues correspond to areas in 
which France has undeniable expertise – be it in 
education (state), social protection, strengthen-
ing financial governance and mobilising fiscal re-
sources. It could be argued that France responds 
to these needs in priority via multilateral channels, 
but this would need to be substantiated and con-
firmed by estimating the contribution earmarked 
and overseen by France through the relevant mul-
tilateral channels. This will be the subject of a fur-
ther study. 
In sections 1 to 5 below, we present the national 
narratives on the reasons for aid as they can be read 
in documents or on the official websites of govern-
ments and development agencies or departments 
of the United Kingdom,2 Germany,3 France4 and 
China.5 We have also added speeches and docu-
ments available on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation’s website.6 In this paper, we quote them 
verbatim in order to avoid any interpretative bias. 
In section 6, we deepen the comparison between 
the actual allocation of French aid and its alloca-
tion as can be surmised from the discourses that 
serve to justify it. Section 7 concludes by identify-
ing various points on which ODA purveyors need 
to remain vigilant in order to strengthen its contri-
bution and value-added by 2030. 
2. For the United Kingdom, the Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), https://www.gov.uk/
government/organisations/department-for-interna-
tional-development/about. The reference publication 
on the UK’s strategy for development is: HM Treasury 
and DFID (2015), “UK aid: tackling global challenges in 
the national interest”.
3. For Germany, we consulted the documents available on 
the website of the Bundesministerium für wirtschaft-
lische Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) 
http://www.bmz.de/ and particularly the documents 
BMZ (2015) “Charter for the Future. One World. Our 
responsibility”; BMZ (2016) “BMZ’s Africa Policy: New 
challenges and focuses”. BMZ Paper 4. Strategy Paper. 
4. The information on French strategy for ODA are 
available on the website France Diplomatie http://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrange-
re-de-la-france/aide-au-developpement/dispositif-in-
stitutionnel-et-canaux-d-acheminement-de-l-aide-fran-
caise/strategie-francaise-en-matiere-d-aide-au-devel-
oppement/ The two documents we chose to focus on 
are the MAE, Direction Générale de la Mondialisation, 
du Développement, et des Partenariats (2011), “De-
velopment Cooperation, a French vision. Framework 
Document.” And the text of the Framework Act No. 
2014-773 of 7 July 2014 on the orientation and program-
ming relative to the development and international sol-
idarity policy, available on the website: https://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEX-
T000029210384&categorieLien=id.
5. For China, the two reference documents are avail-
able at: China’s Foreign Aid (2011), http://english.
gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/con-
tent_281474986284620.htm
 And China’s Foreign Aid (2014), http://english.
gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/con-
tent_281474982986592.htm
6. http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ particularly the 
pages “Development Policy and Finance—Strate-
gy Overview” http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Development-Poli-
cy-Finance#bodyregion_0_interiorarticle_0_strat-
egysections_1_strategysubsectionsa39afdfabce-
745f2a43a74502161be71_0_lnkHeader. In addition to 
this is the report “Innovation with Impact: Financing 
21st Century Development”, a report by Bill Gates to 
G20 leaders, Cannes Summit, November 2011.
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Box 1. What the term “aid” encompasses in 
this paper 
 › Several different definitions are mentioned by the donors: 
 m Official development assistance (ODA) strictly speaking, 
as defined by the OECD’s DAC, that is, all contributions 
of concessional public resources to developing countries 
(or multilateral institutions) with the main objective of 
promoting economic development and welfare.7
 m Cooperation and international development policies: in 
other words, policies intended to improve the economic 
and social welfare of populations in developing coun-
tries; this term includes but is not limited to the contri-
bution of resources.
 m Finance for development, which has no single definition: 
this term denotes the array of financing options avail-
able to developing countries in view of their economic, 
social and environmental development; these financ-
ing options can be either public or private, national or 
international.8
 › Here, the term “aid” encompasses the first two definitions. 
Source: OECD
7. http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-de-
velopment/index-terms.htm#ODA
8. Idem.
Box 2. The Addis Ababa Agreement on 
Financing for Development 
 › The Addis-Ababa Action Agenda marks a turning point in the 
history of development finance. The novelty compared to the 
Monterrey Consensus, which preceded it, lies in the concomi-
tance of at least four elements: 
 m Revived ambitions: complete the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, integrate the climate objective into the 
development agenda, promote sustainable economic 
models. 
 m The agreement on a better sharing of tasks among the 
actors: an increasing role for the private sector, sub-
national government, civil society, South-South coopera-
tion and development finance institutions. 
 m Recognition of the opportunity of using a broader array 
of tools: loan-grant blending, vertical funds, innovative 
financing, risk sharing, guarantees, etc. 
 m The emergence of new methods of learning to bet-
ter integrate the three preceding elements: platforms, 
experience-sharing, multi-stakeholder collaboration, 
networking.
Source: IDDRI
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1. FIRST NARRATIVE: BORN OF 
WAR, ODA WILL ONLY DISAPPEAR 
WITH PEACE (UNITED KINGDOM)
1.1. The affirmation of 
British self-interest
Championing the international cause to eradi-
cate extreme poverty and reputed for its “Make 
Poverty History” initiative, which received support 
from the highest levels of government, the United 
Kingdom substantially revised its priorities in 2015 
at the height of the “migrant crisis”, to use the term 
coined by the British press. This was the same year 
that the run of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) came to a close. 
“This strategy outlines our new approach to aid 
spending that we believe will command public 
confidence. The world is changing, and our strat-
egy on aid needs to change with it.” (HM Treasury 
and DFID, 2015, p.3)
While the eradication of extreme poverty re-
mains one of the hallmarks of British development 
policy, its main focus is on the questions of insta-
bility, insecurity and conflict (Box 3). 
Box 3. The four strategic objectives of British 
ODA 
 › Strengthening global peace, security and governance: the 
government will invest more to tackle the causes of insta-
bility, insecurity and conflict, and to tackle crime and cor-
ruption. This is fundamental to poverty reduction overseas, 
and will also strengthen our own national security at home. 
 › Strengthening resilience and response to crises: this 
includes more support for ongoing crises including that 
in Syria and other countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa region, more science and technology spend on global 
public health risks such as antimicrobial resistance, and 
support for efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
 › Promoting global prosperity: the government will use 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to promote eco-
nomic development and prosperity in the developing world. 
This will contribute to the reduction of poverty and also 
strengthen UK trade and investment opportunities around 
the world. 
 › Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most 
vulnerable: the government will strive to eliminate extreme 
poverty by 2030, and support the world’s poorest.
Source: HM Treasury and DFID (2015). UK aid: tackling global challenges in the na-
tional interest (p. 3).
The reasons for this change lie in four successive 
arguments: 
 m The world faces new challenges. These chal-
lenges affect both the world’s poorest and peo-
ple in the UK. 
 m Global insecurity is rising and the risk of con-
flict in previously stable parts of the world is 
increasing. 
 m Migration is a global challenge. Instability, ex-
tremism and conflict in the Middle East and Afri-
ca have displaced millions of people, with many 
having sought to travel to Europe. It has created 
a serious humanitarian challenge, which is cre-
ating pressures across the European Union. 
 m Poverty is falling—but maintaining this trend 
will depend on continued strong economic 
growth. In the future, extreme poverty is likely 
to be concentrated in fragile countries. (ibid., 
p. 7; authors’ emphasis)
Anticipating the future geography of extreme 
poverty, the United Kingdom connects its latest 
security objectives to those more typical of the 
Blair, Brown and Cameron years focusing on the 
MDGs—and more specifically on poverty reduc-
tion. This update of the bi-partisan MDG Agenda 
can be interpreted as continuity in the logic of pri-
oritization and concentration. A continuity also in 
the idea that if some of the objectives that are seen 
as cornerstones of the Development Agenda were 
to fail, the whole structure of the Agenda would be 
at risk of collapse. 
“Risks” and “threats” are each cited more than 
ten times in the United Kingdom’s strategic ref-
erence document. The word “value” hardly ever 
appears—except as value for money and in the 
Commonwealth’s focus on promoting “democrat-
ic values”. The word “cooperation” is never men-
tioned, and neither is the term “transformation”, 
which has shot to the top of the 2030 Agenda.
“National interest” is now the linchpin of British 
ODA—the number of times the term occurs is im-
pressive. The title of the framework document is in 
itself unambiguous: “Tackling global challenges in 
the national interest”. (Authors’ emphasis). The 
(achieved) objective of 0.7% is itself justified in 
view of national interest and power:
The UK leads the world on international de-
velopment, and has kept its promises on aid (p. 
5). We firmly believe that spending 0.7% of Gross 
National Income (GNI) on international devel-
opment—alongside our commitment to spend 
2% on defence—means our country walking 
taller in the world (ibid., p. 3).
Finally, what should not be overlooked is the 
statement that aid must ultimately lead to its own 
disappearance. 
We are ending the need for aid by building 
peaceful and stable societies, creating jobs and 
strong economies, fighting corruption, unlock-
ing the potential of girls and women, tackling 
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climate change and helping to save lives when 
humanitarian emergencies hit. We are doing this 
because it is both the right thing to do and firmly 
in Britain’s national interest. (DFID website; au-
thors’ emphasis)
Born in the post-war years to ensure security9—
British aid is returning to its roots and promises to 
disappear in a world of peace. 
1.2. The hallmarks of leadership: 
fragile States, governance 
and sustainable finance 
A particularly useful document for identifying 
the British “hallmark” regarding the resources 
mobilized and the priorities, in addition to the 
discourse on the objectives just mentioned, lies 
in the consultation headed by the British Parlia-
ment’s International Development Committee.10 
Unless otherwise mentioned, the quotations below 
are from this report. 
The British Parliament identifies three areas of 
excellence for the United Kingdom, all of which 
stem from the means used to implement the 2030 
Agenda. In order of appearance—in the body 
of the report and not in the executive summary, 
which changes the order and prioritizes the fight 
against corruption ahead of ODA—we find the 
“vital role” played by ODA, the fight against cor-
ruption and tax evasion, and the maximising of 
capital markets with, interestingly, mention of the 
London Stock Exchange. To a lesser extent, there 
is also support for private investment through the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation—re-
capitalised in 2015—and the Prosperity Fund to 
complete the United Kingdom’s “2030 hallmarks” 
justifying ODA. 
First and foremost, ODA is indispensable—as is 
the United Kingdom since it is called on to use its 
influence to support and increase the commitment 
of other donors: 
Although ODA is just part of the solution to 
raising development finance for the SDGs, it still 
plays a vital role, particularly for the poorest 
countries. According to the OECD, “ODA remains 
the biggest financial flow in fragile states. ... As 
a respected leader in the donor community, 
the UK Government should continue to use 
its influence to persuade other countries to 
9. On the security-related origins of aid, see for example 
the still relevant work of Carbonnier (2010), Brainard 
(2006), and Charnoz and Severino (2007). 
10. House of Commons, International Development Com-
mittee (2016). UK implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. First Report of Session 2016-17.
fulfil—and where possible strengthen—their 
ODA commitments as outlined in the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda and SDG target 17.2 (au-
thors’ emphasis). 
ODA is a hallmark of the United Kingdom even 
though, according to the British Government’s 
statements cited in the section above, the 2030 
Agenda goes “beyond aid”. 
It is not the only one. In its report, Parliament 
recalls that, following the release of the Panama 
Papers in March 2016, the British Government 
launched a series of initiatives to counter tax eva-
sion and financial secrecy. The report also com-
mends the Anti-Corruption Summit in London (12 
May 2016) initiated by the prime minister, again as 
much for the response it brought as for who was 
behind it: 
We recognise the impact of tax evasion on 
developing countries’ ability to raise revenues 
and welcome the Prime Minister’s decision 
to host the recent Anti-Corruption Summit 
in London, positioning the UK as a leader in 
this debate…We welcome the Addis Tax Initia-
tive and the Government’s strong commitment 
to supporting the development of effective tax 
systems in some of the world’s poorest countries. 
Prioritising assistance to developing countries, 
particularly Least Developed Countries, in im-
plementing effective tax collection systems will be 
crucial in enabling countries to raise the revenue 
needed to implement the SDGs. (p. 18)
Making private finance “sustainable” is the third 
driver foregrounded for achieving the ambitions 
of the 2030 Agenda, and unravel the magic formu-
la for moving from billions (of ODA) to the trillions 
needed. The gradual alignment of finance with 
climate objectives and the symbolic power of Car-
ney’s London speech about the risk that the “car-
bon bubble” is creating for major financial cen-
tres11 propel a similar search for the alignment of 
financial practices with the social or societal inter-
ests embodied in the SDGs. The report mentions 
one fund manager who points out that: 
The Government is already taking action to 
harness the markets to support sustainable de-
velopment, highlighting that, “HM Treasury has 
recently launched, in conjunction with the City 
of London, a Green Finance Initiative to advance 
proposals on how to increase and incentivise 
private sector finance in the green economy”. 
(p. 21) 
11. Carney, M. 2015. Breaking the tragedy of the horizon. 
Climate change and financial stability. Speech given at 
Lloyd’s of London. 29 September 2015. 
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Parliament replies: “There is no reason why 
these efforts could not be expanded within the 
framework of the SDGs.” (p. 21)
We recognise the potential—and need—to 
harness the trillions of dollars tied up in the cap-
ital markets to achieve the SDGs. London is the 
world’s leading financial centre, meaning that 
the UK Government is in a strong and unique 
position to look at how this could be done. (p. 
21) … To harness the finance tied up in capital 
markets, DFID and other relevant government 
departments should also enter into discussions 
with the London Stock Exchange and the City of 
London to explore how they might work together 
to create better incentives for sustainable devel-
opment in the capital markets. (p.3)
2. SECOND NARRATIVE: GIFT AND 
COUNTER-GIFT—PROSPERITY 
GOES HAND IN HAND WITH 
OBLIGATIONS (GERMANY) 
2.1. One world, our responsibility
The strategic documents make for fascinating 
reading, as the national narratives are very 
different both in tone and in substance. The 
case of Germany shows us motives and objec-
tives that differ starkly from those of the United 
Kingdom. While both nations draw on the historic 
roots of aid—which emerged post-war to rebuild 
Europe and safeguard against Soviet influence –, 
Germany underlines the special relationship that 
it has developed with this instrument. As a former 
beneficiary of aid, Germany conceives that it 
carries some obligations in exchange, as in some 
kind of system of gift/counter-gift. Moreover, 
Germany has acquired first-hand experience in the 
virtues of aid: it was surely under the effects of the 
Marshall Plan that the country was able to move 
swiftly from the status of recipient, in 1961, to that 
of donor, and open the first Ministry of Develop-
ment in Europe.
Germany was itself once a recipient of inter-
national aid programmes. The country was dev-
astated during the Second World War and sub-
sequently received billions of dollars in support 
from the United States under the Marshall Plan. 
It taught the German population how important 
and successful aid can be. The prosperity and 
values that are characteristic of today’s Germany 
are also a consequence of this forward-looking 
post-war policy. And, not least, it is this experi-
ence that induced the German government to 
take on an active role in regard to development 
policy and, in 1961, to become first country in Eu-
rope to establish a development ministry.12 
Other marked differences characterise the Brit-
ish and German cases. Germany insists on the 
consequences of globalisation—an interconnected 
world that creates the need for international co-
operation and the delivery of global responses to 
global challenges. 
Today, our lives are much more interconnected 
with those of people living on other continents 
than ever before. We have many advantages be-
cause of that. However, it also means that we 
have greater responsibility than previous gener-
ations, because the international community is 
facing challenges for which it needs to find global 
solutions. Radical changes need to be made—at 
global level and as soon as possible.
Visibly, aid is only one response among many 
that lie outside of the world of aid—responses that 
are either not forthcoming or insufficient (“Radical 
changes need to be made—at global level”). Ger-
many, unlike the United Kingdom, insists on the 
transformations required in light of the new mag-
nitude of the challenges, even if the word “trans-
formation” is not cited as such—“radical changes” 
is on a similar note. Another notable difference is 
that Germany sets little store by “national inter-
est”. Not that aid is conceived from a purely altru-
istic point of view,13 but what is foregrounded is the 
general interest—rarely Germany’s interest, which 
is never worded as such in the texts. Thus, after 
stating a series of general objectives that more or 
less foreshadow the SDGs:
The German government is actively engaged, 
in close cooperation with the international com-
munity, in combating poverty, securing food, 
establishing peace, freedom, democracy and hu-
man rights, shaping globalisation in a socially 
equitable manner, and preserving the environ-
ment and natural resources. 
Germany specifies the beneficiaries of ODA: 
Development cooperation is one of the most 
important instruments for achieving these 
goals. The German government regards it as an 
12. http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/principles/
index.html
13. In its 14th report on development policy, the German 
Government specifies that bilateral aid allocated by 
BMZ must meet four criteria: governance performance 
in partner countries, poverty and needs, Germany’s 
comparative advantage with respect to other donors, 
and “German interests” which are immediately qual-
ified as “(including strategic partnerships and global 
environmental goods)”. (BMZ, 2013, p. 26). 
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imperative of humanity and of reason. Develop-
ment cooperation guarantees a future for people 
in developing countries—and thus for everyone 
else, too.” (Authors’ emphasis).
“Everyone else” includes Germany but is not 
the same as “national interest”. German ODA re-
sponds to an obligation—that of holding its own 
and helping to resolve the world’s problems, in 
line with its human and financial means, including 
those brought on by its involvement in the agenda 
and reform of multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank, the G7 or the G20. As in the British 
case, the title of the flagship report on ODA is em-
blematic here: One world. Our responsibility. 
2.2. Priorities: human 
rights, institutional reform 
and climate finance
In the document submitted to the High-Level 
Political Forum in view of the first meeting on the 
progress made towards the implementation of the 
2030 Agenda, Germany points out that in terms 
of volume ODA is one of its hallmarks, even if it 
cannot claim to have reached the 0.7% of GNI.14 
Germany’s ODA (Official Development As-
sistance) has increased steadily in recent years; 
the OECD’s latest ODA estimate for 2015 shows 
continual increases to around 16.0 billion euros. 
That makes Germany the third-largest donor 
in absolute figures; Germany’s ODA rose from 
0.38% of gross national income (GNI) in 2013, to 
0.42% of GNI in 2014 and 0.52% of GNI in 2015. 
About 0.09 percentage points of the increase re-
corded between 2014 and 2015 were accounted 
for by the costs of providing for refugees in Ger-
many, some of which costs are classified as ODA. 
Spending on development cooperation con-
tinues to be one of the German Government’s 
top priorities. It has increased its spending 
several times in recent years and a further 
rise is planned for 2017. (Authors’ emphasis)
The increase in Germany’s ODA spending in 2015 
was in fact almost entirely due to its actions to cope 
with migrants, but raises doubts as to whether this 
increase will continue and criticisms of the confu-
sion between internal security and development.15 
14. German Federal Government, 2016. Report of the Ger-
man Federal Government to the High-Level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development 2016. 12 July 2016. 
15. Oxfam is probably one of the most virulent organisa-
tions on this issue. See for example: https://www.eu-
ractiv.fr/section/aide-au-developpement/interview/
weekend-or-monoxfam-our-red-lines-on-securitisa-
tion-and-conditionality-of-eu-aid/
Yet Germany has nonetheless demonstrated that it 
knows how to make the necessary means available 
when faced with the general objectives of respon-
sibility and the solidarity of “gift and counter-gift” 
mentioned in the first section. As it benefited from 
ODA and is today in a position to pass that benefit 
on to others, Germany is duty bound to be a high-
ranking donor. Likewise, because, since the early 
post-war years and reunification, German families 
are well aware of what it means to be displaced 
and welcomed and able to offer hospitality, this 
hospitality is a due. There is an undeniable coher-
ence between the country’s discourse on the ends 
and its mobilisation of the means. 
All the same, our reading seems to indicate that 
Germany’s main “2030 hallmark” lies in its efforts 
to leverage the country’s voice and influence with-
in the pluri-lateral and multilateral institutions in 
favour of developing countries. A lightly stamped 
hallmark, but a hallmark all the same. Develop-
ment makes headway on the basis of rules and law, 
and it is by strengthening the former, by firming 
up the latter to the benefit of developing countries 
that German cooperation policy finds the argu-
ments that mark it out and thus justify its policy.
The rising need for common global action calls 
for strong and united action on the part of mul-
tilateral cooperation, with the goal of improving 
the international framework for sustainable de-
velopment, gearing multilateral organisations 
to the promotion of sustainable development 
around the globe, and ensuring that they make 
the best possible use of their comparative ad-
vantages. In its capacity as a member of the 
United Nations, the EU and the OECD, as well 
as other international organisations, and as 
one of largest shareholders in the World Bank 
and regional development banks, Germany is 
supporting the necessary reform and strategy 
processes within these organisations. Without 
a strong and efficient United Nations, there can 
be no solution to global problems. Germany 
is actively supporting the reform of the UN 
development system and is pushing for an an-
choring of reform projects within the scope of the 
Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review nego-
tiations (authors’ emphasis). 
The second hallmark lies in the promotion of hu-
man rights, which is fundamentally inseparable 
from the German cooperation and development 
policy. 
Respecting, protecting and safeguarding hu-
man rights are among the criteria that deter-
mine the nature and extent of Germany’s de-
velopment cooperation with a partner country. 
Through the human rights strategy it published 
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in May 2011, the BMZ is operationalising the 
human rights-based approach systematically 
in its work. In accordance with the strategy, hu-
man rights standards and principles are includ-
ed when preparing sector, regional and country 
strategies, as well as joint donor strategies. Ger-
many is thus an international leader in this 
field16 (authors’ emphasis).
Note that it is with reference to protecting hu-
man rights that health (including rights to sexual 
and reproductive health) appears among Germa-
ny distinctive characteristics (“Health—A human 
right” to cite the catchphrase of BMZ). 
Finally, the commitment to climate matters 
stands as Germany’s final hallmark, in a corpus of 
texts where any reference to an explicit posture of 
champion is extremely rare—the German Govern-
ment’s discourse on this is striking above all for its 
modesty.
In 2014, the German government committed a 
total of more than 2.344 billion euros in official 
budget funds for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. About 85 per cent of this sum came 
from the BMZ’s budget. Since 2005, Germany’s 
commitments have grown almost fivefold (from 
471 million euros at the time), and in 2014 Ger-
many became, for the first time, the largest 
bilateral donor of climate finance. (Authors’ 
emphasis)
Germany is leading the way:
In 2009, the world’s industrialised countries 
made a commitment to provide, from 2020, an 
annual 100 billion US dollars from public and 
private sources for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation in developing countries.…In 
order to further increase confidence in inter-
national climate finance, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel announced in May 2015 that the 
German government is planning to double Ger-
man climate finance by 2020. In making that 
announcement, Germany led the way.… With 
this increase and the additional private fund-
ing that can be mobilised as a result, the target 
of 100 billion dollars from 2020 onwards is now 
within reach. Germany’s share in that amount 
would be about ten per cent (authors’ emphasis).
The “climate” hallmark is a further addition 
to the first hallmark, and stamped by Germany 
alongside those of other institutions:
16. https://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/issues/Hu-
manRights/allgemeine_menschenrechte/deutsche_
entwicklungspolitik/German-engagement-in-part-
ner-countries/index.html
Within the G7, Germany is pushing for the 
ambitious implementation of the SDGs and, 
under the German Presidency in 2015, made an 
important contribution with its commitment to 
climate change mitigation: the G7 is aiming to 
decarbonise the global economy by the end of this 
century and put its energy sector on a new foot-
ing by 2050 in order to limit global warming to 
well below 2° Celsius, ideally to 1.5° Celsius. The 
G7 states are also aiming to apply labour, social 
and environmental standards more rigorously 
in global supply chains and have set themselves 
the goal to free 500 million people in developing 
countries and emerging economies from hunger 
and malnutrition by 2030. 
Also within the framework of the G20, the Ger-
man Government is pushing for the across-the-
board implementation of the SDGs, and is urg-
ing all member states to engage more strongly 
at national level, for example through national 
sustainable development strategies. The German 
Government will translate this into more specific 
terms in the course of the German Presidency in 
2017 and will push for a stronger alignment of 
the G20’s work with the 2030 Agenda.
3. THIRD NARRATIVE: ODA 
FORESHADOWS GLOBAL PUBLIC 
POLICIES (FRANCE)
3.1. Correcting the failings 
of globalisation
The major concern for France, since it was 
expressed in its vision of international coopera-
tion (MAE, 2011), is steering globalisation and 
managing interdependencies. This vision is also 
presented in the Framework Act of 2014, although 
with less emphasis.
France’s development and international soli-
darity policy has the ambition to better steer a 
globalisation that upholds humanist values.17 
For what reason? Because after ten years of re-
cord global growth:
Worldwide, it is becoming clear that the ben-
efits of globalisation are coming up against a 
17. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid-
Texte=JORFTEXT000029210384&categorieLien=id. 
We can also mention here the programmatic title of the 
book Mieux gérer la mondialisation? L’aide publique 
au développement, by Aurélien Lechevallier, Jennifer 
Moreau and François Pacquement, Editions Ellipses, 
2007. 
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lack of governance and collective action. Aspira-
tions for a more equitable growth respectful of 
individual rights, sustainability and global pub-
lic goods call for the implementation of global 
policies. These policies need to give meaningful 
direction to this ongoing globalisation in order 
to maximise its benefits—also for developing 
countries –, more effectively manage the up-
heavals it causes and make sure that it will not 
lead humanity into an impasse. (MAE 2011, p. 6, 
authors’ emphasis)
French ODA can be read implicitly as an in-
strument at the service of a project offering an 
alternative to liberal liberalisation (“liberal” in 
the French sense of the term) embodied in the 
Washington Consensus and the structural ad-
justment of the 1980s and 1990s. French ODA 
can thus be read in the shadow of Keynes and 
Hirschman, and the conviction that even a rich 
world glutted with savings cannot count on the 
invisible hand of capital markets to produce the 
goods and services essential to the prosperity of 
nations. 
French aid can also be read explicitly as an in-
strument of cooperation that cannot be limited 
to financial cooperation—a cooperation devoted 
to the elaboration of global public policies vital 
to the production of global public goods. The 
first ODA opted for resistance, the second tells 
a “positive story” of international cooperation 
between liberal nations (this time in the Anglo-
Saxon sense of the term “liberal”, to further com-
plicate matters) as formulated during the Clin-
ton (Bill)–Blair–Schröder–Jospin years, between 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and that of Manhat-
tan’s towers. 
Whether making an implicit or explicit reading 
of them, the goals of French ODA are explicitly 
political—in the sense of public policies, which it 
intends to strengthen in the recipient countries.
“Development requires a State with a stra-
tegic approach, able to invest in the long term 
while maintaining social consensus.”18 
Also a strengthening within the global space, to 
take one of Bertrand Badie’s expressions. 
In a universal perspective, France intends to 
foster the emergence of global public policies, 
notably through its action in the international 
arenas (United Nations organisations, Bretton 
Woods institutions, G8 and G20) and through its 
participation in many vertical funds.19 
18. MAE (2011). 
19. RF (2014).
The similarities with Germany are as striking as 
the dissimilarities with the United Kingdom: the 
insistence on international cooperation (“global 
policy” replaces the German “global solutions”, 
but this is with semantic nuance), management of 
interdependencies—and again, unlike the British 
case, a very broad array of objectives. The objec-
tives of the development policy outlined in Act No. 
2014-773 are extremely general: 
France implements a development and inter-
national solidarity policy that has the general 
objective of promoting sustainable development 
in developing countries, while at the same time 
participating in the international effort to 
fight against extreme poverty and to reduce 
inequalities.
The italicised in bold emphasis is ours, to signal 
the deliberate difference from the British case: 
France maintains the goal of poverty reduction 
but links it up to reducing equalities. This latter 
objective was intensely debated during the SDGs 
negotiations and was, as is known, ultimately in-
tegrated against the initial wishes of the United 
Kingdom and the United States.20
This policy simultaneously covers four large 
areas: Promotion of peace, stability, human 
rights and equality between women and men…
Equity, social justice and human development…
Sustainable economic development generating 
high levels of employment… Preservation of the 
environment and global public goods (RF, 2014). 
Although the objectives suffer from this global 
ambition given the magnitude of the task, what 
is nonetheless clear is that ODA cannot claim to 
reach them by itself. What was cryptic in the Ger-
man case is made explicit here: 
ODA alone, which represents 0.2% of the 
world’s income, cannot meet the challenges of de-
velopment; the challenge of mobilising resources 
other than aid is thus essential. In this perspec-
tive, France wishes to continue promoting the 
growth of fiscal resources in developing countries 
through strengthened support to tax administra-
tions, as well as private, local and international 
investment. (RF, 2014).
ODA’s role of a “catalyst” for other sources of fi-
nance (private, public, international or domestic) 
and its “leverage effect” are mentioned on several 
occasions, running through French discourse both 
before and after the 2015 Addis Ababa Conference. 
This role of catalyst and leverage that French ODA 
20. Chancel and Voituriez (2015). 
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is expected to play belongs to a vision, which is 
not strictly financial, of international cooperation 
whose end goal is to build global policies. 
As part of an “overall development approach” 
where aid is but one lever among others, French 
ODA serves a political project that continues to 
give the State—the Nation State, strategist State, 
Financing State—a preponderant role in the devel-
opment process, in North and South alike, greater 
than the absolute minimum of correcting market 
failings. 
3.2. “Swiss knife” ODA: 
differentiation and co-benefits
French strategy for resource distribution, which 
is part of the justification and hallmark of its aid, 
is based on a geographic typology comprising 
four kinds of partnerships depending on the 
types of country, the issues involved and the 
forms of action. The 16 priority poor countries 
(PPCs) concentrate French solidarity efforts in 
the form of grant funding to objectives covering 
a large spectrum of sustainable development. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and neighbouring 
countries in the South and East Mediterranean 
account for 85% of the French State’s financial 
effort to development of all kinds: grants, budget 
aid, subsidised and non-subsidised loans, sover-
eign and non-sovereign loans, equity investments, 
guarantees and other innovative finance for SSA; 
loans to countries in the South and East Mediter-
ranean. Countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile 
contexts that are not included among the PPCs, 
“are given specific attention” and financial assis-
tance with a preference for grants. Finally the 
rest of the world, notably countries in Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean most of which are 
middle-income countries, receive financial flows 
of little or no cost to the governments (excluding 
technical expertise). French “differentiation” 
thus combines three dimensions—geographic, 
economic and thematic. 
The changes that the 2030 Agenda might in-
duce to the differentiated approach characteris-
ing French ODA are still a matter of speculation 
insofar as the strategic documents establishing 
France’s role, comparative advantage and its pri-
orities in implementing the Agenda are currently 
being drafted. The publication of the French Eco-
nomic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) 
“Quelles nouvelles orientations et priorités pour la 
politique française de coopération internationale 
dans le cadre de l’agenda 2030 du développement 
durable?” (“What new orientations and priorities 
for French international cooperation policy un-
der the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda?”) 
brings responses that are still maturing, according 
to the ministers and agency directors consulted on 
the subject.21 We have thus fallen back on docu-
ments that for the most part were written before 
the adoption of the SDGs, although many of these 
were drafted with the SDGs in mind. For want of a 
strategic document highlighting the value added of 
French ODA in the context of the 2030 Agenda, we 
will propose, in a necessarily speculative manner, 
the possible hallmarks that France could take on. 
Before the preparation for COP21 and its bid to 
make this a success, France had wanted to forge 
an “international ‘climate’ identity”, to reprise 
the words of the “2012-2016 Climate and Devel-
opment Intervention Framework” (CIT) of the 
Agence Française de Développement Group.22 
Underlining that “Climate change has become 
central to AFD’s economic model”, the CIT re-
calls that “through AFD, France is one of the most 
important actors in financing the fight against 
climate change”. The text points out (highlight-
ing 2010 data) that “this level of commitments—
about 10 percent of all international climate-
related aid—positions AFD as a major fighter of 
climate change in developing countries.” “AFD 
has developed industry-standard methods and 
tools to measure the impact of climate-related 
funding”, which are more effective that the Rio 
markers, whose shortcomings are well known.23 
On its website, AFD presents itself as “qualitative-
ly and quantitatively, a major innovative player in 
international ‘climate’ finance, notably due to the 
financing methods and instruments used”.24 
Noting that “AFD has gradually become a rec-
ognized French and international player” in fi-
nancing the fight against climate change, the 
CIT document underlines that “AFD has signifi-
cant comparative advantages when it comes to 
financing the fight against climate change in 
developing countries”. These include the critical 
mass reached by its interventions, the availability 
of flexible and diversified tools, know-how and in-
novation, knowledge of the field and the capacity 
to mobilise expertise. Although derided at times 
21. CESE (2016). La politique française de coopération inter-
nationale dans le cadre de l’agenda 2030 du développe-
ment durable. Avis du CESE sur le rapport présenté par 
M. Philippe Jahshan, rapporteur. 
22. 2012-2016 Climate and Development Intervention 
Framework, Agence Française de Développement 
Group. Memo 
23. Rivera Delgado, A.S. (2015). Méthodologie de notifica-
tion des financements climatiques publics. Working pa-
per IDDRI. 
24. http://www.afd.fr/home/projets_afd/
changement_climatique/strategie_climat/
engagement-en-faveur-developpement-climat
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for its low level of grant funding, “in this context, 
AFD can continue expanding its role as a leading 
climate financier, by using loans primarily and by 
highly leveraging France’s and the international 
community’s resources cost-effectively.”
To affirm its “’climate’ identity” and since the 
release of the note of the CIT, AFD has committed 
to maintaining its annual average “climate” alloca-
tions in the medium term at 50% of total AFD al-
locations to foreign States, and Proparco’s annual 
allocations at 30%.25 The President of the Republic 
has “wished to increase the Agence française de 
développement (AFD) Group’s funding for sus-
tainable development by 4 billion euros by 2020, 
including 2 billion to be devoted to climate chal-
lenges. In parallel, an additional 400 million will 
be allocated to the most fragile countries in the 
form of grants over the same timeline. These new 
means of implementing French development pol-
icy will be defined at the meeting of the Intermin-
isterial Committee on International Cooperation 
and Development in November 2016. This is the 
direction of France’s effort to re-engage with an 
upward trajectory of official development aid.”26
The idea of climate “co-benefit” brings a nuance 
to what an over-hasty reading might seem to be 
portfolio specialisation in the energy transition. 
The ambition is to show the way towards a port-
folio that must ultimately fully contribute to the 
transformation to an economic and social devel-
opment compatible with the climate challenges 
and the finite nature of resources. 
The “climate” hallmark of French ODA and the 
comparative advantage that this foregrounds 
hide a second hallmark: the great flexibility and 
variety of financing instruments. As banal as this 
justification may seem, it is not worthless: one of 
the key characteristics of French aid within the 
ecosystem of sustainable development financ-
ing is the fact that it has a dedicated banking 
group with a wide range of financing modalities 
enabling it to offer sovereign and non-sovereign 
loans, subsidised or not, and allocate (certainly 
meagre) grants funding. 
25. With nearly €2.648 billion “climate” funding approvals 
granted to developing countries in 2015, AFD (excluding 
Proparco) reached a level of 55% (against 53% in 2014) 
of “climate” allocations, and for the second time exceed-
ed its annual objective 50% fixed in its climate-develop-
ment strategy.
26. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrange-
re-de-la-france/aide-au-developpement/l-agenda-in-
ternational-du-developpement/
In its Memorandum on cooperation policy,27 
France underlines one of the features of French 
strategy that “aims to combine public develop-
ment aid with other sources of development fi-
nance in a complementary approach”, recalling 
that “it represents amounts that are substantially 
lower than the other sources in many countries”. 
It foregrounds its “toolbox”, which can offer “sup-
port tailored to the needs and technical, financial 
and institutional capacities of each partner”, in-
cluding financing for local authorities and inno-
vative financing—an area in which France has a 
certain reputation. 
With no discourtesy to French cutlers, the ODA 
hallmark is a little like a multi-purpose Swiss 
knife. It is all the more compelling when associ-
ated with the previous hallmark, which elimi-
nates the distinction between “development” and 
“climate” to advocate new development models 
that from a pragmatic stance inevitably require an 
extremely broad panoply of instruments that are 
not limited to grants. Disconnected from the first 
hallmark, the “instrumental” hallmark of French 
ODA (“Swiss-knife” aid) is somewhat blurred: it 
does not basically distinguish French ODA from 
the ODA of countries that also have development 
banks—Germany, Japan, Italy—without forget-
ting the multilateral banks and funding agencies 
in developing countries. 
Other hallmarks are possible, and the CICID 
meeting in November 2016 and the announced 
rapprochement between AFD and the CDC could 
give France the chance to test or confirm these. We 
mention them very briefly here as they are outside 
the scope of our analysis of existing discourses 
and thus simply hypothetical. Education (state), 
and expertise in social sectors and specifically 
social protection, with experience in financing in 
countries with very diverse income levels such as 
Colombia or Cambodia, are all assets that France 
could move forward in the context of a 2030 Agen-
da judged to be socially progressive.28 The double 
hallmark of a toolbox and an objective in line with 
a “French” vision of a development model (here a 
social model) would doubtless be as acceptable as 
the AFD’s development-climate duo. 
27. MAE (2013). Memorandum of French Development 
Co-operation (available in French only) Working docu-
ment prepared for the mission of the reviewers in Paris. 
Report submitted to the DAC in October 2012.
28. Vaillé, J., Brimont, L. (2016). Faire des objectifs de dével-
oppement durable un levier d’action politique, pour les 
pays européens et la France. Policy Briefs 2/16. IDDRI. 
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4. FOURTH NARRATIVE: AID 
TO SERVE A PROJECT FOR 
EMANCIPATION (CHINA) 
Rendering the official Chinese discourse on aid and 
describing China’s hallmark proved more sensitive 
than was the case for the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. In fact, we have very few documen-
tary sources for China. All in all, there are two 
official documents that enabled us to describe the 
principles and priorities for Chinese aid. The first, 
the White Paper on Foreign Aid dates back to 2011.29 
The second, published in 2014,30 is a revised version 
of the first. Both these white papers are in line 
with the 8 key principles of Chinese aid stated by 
the first Premier Zhou Enlai on his visit to Ghana in 
1964 (Box 4). We draw on these two documents to 
clarify the Chinese Government’s justifications for 
development aid. We will complete this reading 
with an analysis of the keys to Chinese aid alloca-
tion in order to clearly describe its hallmark. 
Box 4. The eight principles of Chinese aid, 
stated in 1964
 › 1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the prin-
ciple of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other 
countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral 
alms but as something mutual.
 › 2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government 
strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, 
and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
 › 3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or 
low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repay-
ment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recip-
ient countries as far as possible.
 › 4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the 
Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries 
dependent on China but to help them embark step by step 
on the road of self-reliance and independent economic 
development.
 › 5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient 
countries build projects which require less investment while 
yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments 
may increase their income and accumulate capital.
 › 6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment 
and material of its own manufacture at international market 
prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese 
Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, 
the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
29. China’s Foreign Aid (2011), English version avail-
able athttp://english.gov.cn/archive/white_pa-
per/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm
30. China’s Foreign Aid (2014), English version avail-
able at http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_pa-
per/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm
 › 7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese 
Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient 
country fully master such technique.
 › 8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in 
the recipient countries will have the same standard of living 
as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts 
are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any 
special amenities.
Source : http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121560. “The 
Chinese Government’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to 
Other Countries,” January 15, 1964.
In its preamble, the 2011 document underlines 
the specific character of Chinese aid:
Adhering to equality and mutual benefit, 
stressing substantial results, and keeping pace 
with the times without imposing any political 
conditions on recipient countries, China’s for-
eign aid has emerged as a model with its own 
characteristics (People’s Republic of China, 
2011; authors’ emphasis in bold). 
This specificity is developed at length in the re-
vised 2014 document; what comes to light when 
reading between lines is the will to be different 
from the previous practices of ODA donor over the 
years:
When providing foreign assistance, China 
adheres to the principles of not imposing any 
political conditions, not interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of the recipient countries and fully 
respecting their right to independently choos-
ing their own paths and models of development. 
The basic principles China upholds in providing 
foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, 
keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win. 
(People’s Republic of China, 2014). 
“Not interfering in the internal affairs” and “not 
imposing any political conditions” are two prin-
ciples found in the Beijing Declaration from the 
Forum on Cooperation between China and Af-
rica (2000): “[t]he politicization of human rights 
and the imposition of human rights conditionali-
ties on economic assistance should be vigorously 
opposed.” 
4.1. Aid justified by the means, 
rather than the ends 
To summarise the two White Papers, Chinese 
assistance involves first and foremost two aspects 
contained in a single sentence: continuity in a 
certain way of operating (the basic principles). 
These principles are detailed in the first chapter 
of the 2011 document. It is first underlined that 
Chinese assistance is part of reciprocal South-
South collaboration. This may be obvious, but it is 
worth recalling it: 
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As development remains an arduous and long-
standing task, China’s foreign aid falls into the 
category of South-South cooperation and is mu-
tual help between developing countries (People’s 
Republic of China, 2011).
In China’s cooperation project, the first feature 
– which may be understood as an objective – is 
autonomy. Although this is not absent from the 
discourses of the DAC donors (notably that of the 
United Kingdom as we saw earlier), the overriding 
ambition is that of endogenous and “independent” 
development: 
Unremittingly helping recipient countries 
build up their self-development capacity. Prac-
tice has proved that a country’s development de-
pends mainly on its own strength. In providing 
foreign aid, China does its best to help recipient 
countries to foster local personnel and techni-
cal forces, build infrastructure, and develop and 
use domestic resources, so as to lay a foundation 
for future development and embarkation on the 
road of self-reliance and independent develop-
ment (People’s Republic of China, 2011). 
A second feature is also somewhat absent from 
the discourses of the other donors, at least framed 
in the same terms. This is pragmatism, realism and 
measure. China must not be asked to do things 
that are beyond what it can do: assistance is pro-
vided in line with China’s abilities, once national 
conditions have been taken into account: 
Remaining realistic while striving for the best. 
China provides foreign aid within the reach of its 
abilities in accordance with its national condi-
tions. Giving full play to its comparative advan-
tages, China does its utmost to tailor its aid to 
the actual needs of recipient countries (People’s 
Republic of China, 2011). 
We should note the term “comparative advan-
tages”, which are a leitmotif of the DAC’s aid ef-
fectiveness, although of course there is no mention 
made of the DAC. 
The final outstanding feature of Chinese cooper-
ation is invariably found in Chinese policies. This 
involves innovation and learning; China learns by 
trial and error. This has proved the case, in recent 
times, of its carbon markets, but also of a broad 
range of public policy instruments:
Keeping pace with the times and paying atten-
tion to reform and innovation. China adapts its 
foreign aid to the development of both domestic 
and international situations, pays attention to 
summarizing experiences, makes innovations in 
the field of foreign aid, and promptly adjusts and 
reforms the management mechanism, so as to 
constantly improve its foreign aid work (People’s 
Republic of China, 2011). 
Accused of conservatism and of reproducing 
on the ground all the shortcomings of tied aid or 
predatory aid when it comes to natural resources, 
China sets out in its key principles a highly “mod-
ern” project akin to the interpretation of moder-
nity that the 2030 Agenda suggests to us: assis-
tance centred around comparative advantages, not 
claiming to know the perfect solutions for develop-
ment, mindful of the autonomy of sovereign States 
in the choice of their objectives and pathways 
(here “models”), and finally part of an innova-
tion and learning process. What transpires in this 
Chinese modernity is the political project that has 
been a steady through-line since 1964: make assis-
tance and cooperation into tools for emancipation 
from the former colonial powers – the project for 
independence and self-reliance needs to be under-
stood within the context in which it was born: that 
of a counter-project to the DAC project, which car-
ries the burden of its donors’ colonial history. 
4.2. Priority set on business 
and infrastructure
Half of China’s assistance is in the form of conces-
sional loans channelled through the Export-Import 
Bank of China; the other half comprises grants and 
interest-free loans. The grants come from many 
state departments and ministries, including the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which is in 
charge of zero-interest loans. China’s multilat-
eral assistance accounts for only 6% of total assis-
tance, estimated at USD 5 billion a year, which 
is the amount of export credit given by China to 
the developing countries it partners with (Kitano, 
2016). The fact that Chinese assistance is associ-
ated with the Ministry of Commerce is unique: 
in the other DAC countries, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs oversees the strategic programming of 
assistance, sometimes jointly with the Ministry for 
Finance and the Economy. Assistance is of use to 
Chinese trade policy and vice versa. So far, Chinese 
assistance has not been the subject of any legisla-
tion submitted for approval by the Congress. 
Sectoral allocation is one of the hallmarks of 
Chinese assistance. If we look at the breakdown of 
concessional loans as reported in the 2014 docu-
ment (RPC, 2014), the main items financed are 
“infrastructure” (61%), “energy and resources” 
(8.9%) and “industry” (16.1%), far ahead of ag-
riculture (4.3%). If “public facilities” (3.2%) are 
added to “infrastructure” and “industry”, this 
yields a concessional loan portfolio 80 % of which 
is devoted to infrastructure in the broadest sense. 
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5. FIFTH NARRATIVE: AID 
IS ESSENTIAL (BMGF)
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has 
for almost 20 years provided alternative and addi-
tional financing to the ODA flows of DAC member 
states, disbursing annually an amount compa-
rable to that of many official donors ($ 3.6 billion 
according to OECD preliminary data in 2015)
In a 2011 report to G20 leaders31, Bill Gates ex-
plains and emphasises the vital role of develop-
ment assistance:
Especially in hard times, some people will 
say rich countries should cut their ODA. They 
should not. Not only because they have made 
promises, but also because important pieces 
of the development agenda won’t be addressed 
without assistance. ODA spurs innovation by 
funding pilot projects that poor countries would 
not undertake themselves. It also pays for global 
public goods like scientific research. Finally, 
people in very poor countries will continue to 
depend on assistance for their survival for the 
foreseeable future. 
Setting aside the issue of moral imperative and 
the obligation to honour promises that have not al-
ways been kept by many donors (0.7% of gross na-
tional income spent on ODA), the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation has put forth in its statement 
three justifications for aid: innovation, scientific 
research and poverty reduction, the first two being 
means that contribute to the third consideration 
which is an overreaching goal. 
5.1. Extreme poverty, an 
ongoing justification for aid
Even though there will be fewer and fewer poor 
countries over time, extreme poverty will remain, 
given the simple fact that the geography of poverty 
is changing, moving toward middle-income 
countries32. 
Most development agencies use a country’s 
average income as the main factor in deciding 
whether it qualifies for aid. So the countries that 
are crossing the threshold into middle-income 
status risk losing much of the aid they’ve been 
getting. Aid should never replace the investments 
that countries need to make in their own people. 
31. Innovation with Impact: Financing 21st Century Devel-
opment. A report by Bill Gates to G20 leaders, Cannes 
Summit, November 2011.
32. Kharas, H., Prizzon, A., Rogerson, A. (2015). Financing 
the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. A rough 
roadmap. ODI. London.
But in some countries, average income obscures 
big pockets of extreme poverty.33
Gates stresses in his official speeches the need 
to better understand the situation of countries—
whether poor or middle-income—and to target aid 
so that it has the most impact on poverty reduc-
tion. By holding to this objective from the MDGs as 
a keystone for its advocacy for aid—targeted aid to 
the very poorest serving an outcome that no other 
source of stable financing is able to attain—the 
Foundation justifies such aid by its unique quali-
ties under the conditions in which it is, or should 
be, used.
Being concessional, stable and non-profit seek-
ing, ODA can target specific areas of need and 
reach the poorest and most vulnerable people.34 
It can be understood from the above that if aid 
distances itself from cases of extreme poverty, it 
loses its comparative advantage over other sourc-
es of financing and its justification fades. Aid is 
unique when it is firmly aimed at the critically 
poor. 
5.2. Financing innovation for 
the poorest populations
“People who are pessimistic about the future 
tend to extrapolate from the present in a straight 
line. But innovation fundamentally shifts the 
trajectory of development”. 
The other argument made by Bill Gates in his re-
port to G20 leaders is that ODA not only helps poor 
countries and poor people, it also spurs innovation 
there where it would not occur on its own: innova-
tion far upstream to production or downstream on 
access and dissemination. Innovation is in and of 
itself a factor for transformation (in the wide sense 
indicated by the title of the 2030 Agenda) but also 
a multiplier of the impact of financial resources 
devoted to development. New plant varieties and 
vaccines have this double nature.
The slow pace of technical progress of “particu-
lar use to the poor” (to use our own terms) can be 
remedied, according to BMGF, with high-growth 
countries intervening with donors (including the 
Foundation) and poor countries, playing a key 
role in “triangular partnerships”. Conservative in 
goals, in the sense that these can be scaled down to 
33. https://www.gatesnotes.com/Development/Who-
Should-Get-Foreign-Aid?WT.mc_id=04_05_2016_10_
ForeignAid_BG-LI_&WT.tsrc=BGLI
34. ODA Allocation and other trends in development coop-
eration in LDCs and other vulnerable contexts. 
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the initial MDG, the Foundation supports the ob-
jective of 0.7% and works to reach it, but it remains 
pragmatic in its modalities.
“Innovation” is frequently used to describe the 
Foundation’s approach. The objective of and jus-
tification for aid is not only to finance innovation 
but to innovate itself, through pilot and demon-
stration projects. It is up to so-called traditional 
governments and donors to replicate and scale up 
successful innovations with the help of the private 
sector.
“Some of the projects we fund will fail. We 
not only accept that, we expect it—because we 
think an essential role of philanthropy is to 
make bets on promising solutions that govern-
ments and businesses can’t afford to make. As we 
learn which bets pay off, we have to adjust our 
strategies and share the results so everyone can 
benefit.”35
6. DISCOURSE VERSUS 
REALITY: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR 
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES BEING 
FINANCED BY FRENCH ODA?
Our approach is to compare France’s official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) financing with the major 
strategic challenges that France has designated for 
assistance—in short, measure the footprint of offi-
cial discourse against the yardstick of facts.
Our starting point is the French discourse. 36 De-
velopment assistance policy supports the overall 
aim for a “globalisation that is better controlled 
and promotes humanist values” and “addresses 
four major challenges simultaneously: promot-
ing peace, stability, human rights…; equity, social 
justice and human development…; sustainable, 
job-rich economic development (…); protecting 
the environment and global public goods” (Frame-
work Law, 2014). To compare this to the reality on 
the ground, we chose to use data from the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), whose 
statistical aggregates makes it possible to break 
down ODA into major challenges and to confirm 
(or not) the main features of France’s official 
“hallmark”.
Our analysis covers the period from 2011, the 
year in which France’s Framework Document on 
35. http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
Who-We-Are/General-Information/
Letter-from-Bill-and-Melinda-Gates
36. The political statements on ODA during the presiden-
tial campaign are discourses of a different nature – pro-
grammatic and electoral; they are not included here
development cooperation37 was published, and 
2015, which is the last year for which we have data.
6.1. Methodology
The data are derived from the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee’s “creditor reporting 
system (CRS)”. These are official ODA statistics on 
countries’ projects and programmes, collected by 
the OECD. The DAC database has the advantage 
of presenting incontestable figures that can be 
compared across countries, and offers an excellent 
level of granularity on development assistance.
The data relate to bilateral official development 
assistance (ODA). An analysis of ODA transiting 
through multilateral agencies will be required to 
complete this study. It requires considerable work 
to reconstruct data and methodological choices, 
looking at the proportion allocated by States com-
pared to the general budget of multilateral agen-
cies, and then the proportion allocated to the dif-
ferent sectors by the same agencies. This will be 
carried at a later stage. However, we considered 
that bilateral assistance was more indicative of 
a state’s “hallmark” than multilateral aid, which 
may be influenced by other contributors.
The results shown here are “commitments”, 
which are useful in that they reveal national choic-
es for financing decisions. “Payments” would have 
indicated decisions made years ago, and generated 
a time lag between the official line and the facts—
difficult to correct in our analysis. Nevertheless, 
the option to use bilateral data does not complete-
ly eliminate this lag: for the DAC, commitments 
correspond to the moment that financing agree-
ments are signed with the beneficiary. The delays 
between granting and signing are lower than those 
between commitments and payments. We rely on 
facial values of loans  (where ODA is paid in the 
form of loans), without using the grant element, 
whether the version with one-time discount rate 
at 10% or the version which will be in force in 2018 
onwards. Our choice prevents us from interpret-
ing ODA commitments as “efforts” but it allows 
us to read commitments as financial contributions 
meeting external financing needs, whatever its 
nature.
Our analysis is based on aggregates: we built a 
correlation table between the strategic challenges 
to be addressed by ODA, based on our analysis of 
national discourses, and the “sectors” defined by 
the OECD in the DAC database.38 This correlation 
37. French Ministry of Foreign affairs (2011), “Devel-
opment cooperation: a French vision. Framework 
Document”
38. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/
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table can be found in Appendix 1. We chose the 
finest possible level of granularity. When a “sec-
tor” in the DAC sense straddles two challenges, 
we have examined the content of the “sector” on a 
project-by-project basis and measured the propen-
sity of commitments for a specific challenge. For 
instance, it was not clear in France’s case whether 
the DAC’s “energy distribution” sector included 
projects “protecting the environment and global 
public goods” or projects for “economic develop-
ment”. By looking through all of the projects, we 
were able to measure what proportion of projects 
to attribute to each of these two challenges.
To identify the relevant strategic challenge for 
each project, we used the title, description and, to 
a lesser extent, the DAC database “markers”, which 
are less reliable and precise than the description. 
For example, in 2015, 43% of the “energy distribu-
tion” sector could be linked with the “protecting 
the environment and global public goods” chal-
lenge because it combined energy efficiency and 
renewable energy projects, while in 2014, 99% of 
the “energy distribution” sector consisted of elec-
trification and energy distribution projects, and 
thus belonged to the “economic development” 
challenge.
“Global public goods” category
Although the “global public goods” category is 
widely debated regarding its scope and content, we 
used the definition provided by France itself. The 
most recent definition is given in the 2014 biannual 
report to Parliament on France’s implementation 
of international development policy.39 Focusing on 
climate issues, the report associates “global public 
goods” with the following sectors: water supply 
and sanitation, energy conservation and demand 
efficiency, electricity production from renewable 
sources, and environmental protection. As men-
tioned above, some sectors in the DAC database 
straddle the “economic development” and “pro-
tecting the environment and global public goods” 
challenges. We conducted a project-by-project, 
year-by-year analysis. We have therefore assigned 
the “protecting the environment and global public 
goods” challenge to the following sectors: “Energy 
policy and administrative management”, which as 
a whole involves projects that raise awareness of 
sustainable development or enhance energy effi-
ciency; part of the “energy distribution” sector (for 
France, 43% from 2015) corresponds to projects for 
energy efficiency; part of the “urban development 
CRS%20purpose%20codes%20-%202016%20flows%20
updated%20April%202016.pdf
39. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Develop-
ment, Implementation of the French development strat-
egy (2012-2013). 2014 biannual report (2014).
and management” sector (for France, 7% in 2013, 
1% in 2014 and 57% in 2015) corresponds to urban 
development projects with climate or environment 
actions, for example, green or sustainable cities; 
and part of the “rural development” sector (for 
France, 6% in 2015, 17% in 2014, 0.3% in 2013, 19% 
in 2012 and 0.1% in 2011) corresponds to projects 
for the environment, use of natural resources or 
biodiversity.
“Economic development” challenge
The “economic development” issue includes the 
following OECD sectors: statistical capacity build-
ing, transport and storage, communications, ener-
gy education/training,40 energy research,41 energy 
generation from non-renewable sources, nuclear 
power plants, part of the energy distribution 
sector,42 banking and financial services, business 
and other services, production sectors, part of the 
urban development and management sector,43 part 
of the rural development sector,44 non-agricultural 
alternative development,45 commodity aid, and ac-
tion relating to debt.46
“Social justice” challenge
The “social justice” challenge includes the fol-
lowing OECD sectors: education, health, popula-
tion/health and reproductive health policy, social 
services, employment policy and administrative 
management, housing policy and administrative 
management, low-cost housing, multisector aid 
40. As the amounts associated with this sector were less 
than €700,000 in 2015, less than €200,000 in 2014 
and 2013, we considered them nonsignificant for our 
analysis.
41. As the amounts associated with this sector were zero for 
the period 2006-2014, and less than €12,000 in 2015, we 
considered them nonsignificant for our analysis.
42. After a project-by-project analysis, the “energy distribu-
tion” sector was classified under the “economic devel-
opment” challenge up to and including 2014. The energy 
distribution projects focused on power transmission and 
distribution lines. From 2015, 43% of the projects are 
classified under “protecting the environment and glob-
al public goods”, as they are projects aimed at enhanc-
ing energy efficiency or developing renewable energy 
sources.
43. After a project-by-project analysis, part of the urban de-
velopment and management” sector was assigned to the 
“protecting the environment and global public goods” 
challenge: 7% in 2013, 1% in 2014 and 57% in 2015, for 
climate or environmental projects, for example, green 
city or sustainable city projects.
44. After a project-by-project analysis, part of the “rural 
development” sector was assigned to the “global public 
good” challenge: 6% in 2015, 17% in 2014, 0.3% in 2013, 
19% in 2012 and 0.1% in 2011, for climate or environ-
mental projects such as biodiversity research projects.
45. As the sector accounted for just $53,000 in 2015, we 
considered it nonsignificant.
46. This sector was treated in a specific way in the second 
part of the analysis.
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for basic social services, culture and recreation, 
narcotics control, social mitigation of HIV/AIDS, 
multisector education/training, developmental 
food aid/food security assistance, and refugees in 
donor countries.47
“Peace and stability” challenge
The “peace and stability” challenge includes the 
following OECD sectors: government and civil so-
ciety, and humanitarian aid.
In the second part of this paper and to avoid 
biasing results, we removed “imputed student 
costs” (costs allocated for students from develop-
ing countries who are studying in France), “refu-
gee costs” (temporary aid48 for refugees from 
developing countries who come to France) and 
debt cancellation from the “social justice” and 
“economic development” challenges respectively. 
These three items are in fact expenses that cannot 
be controlled, making it impossible for us to ana-
lyse whether France had implemented its official 
national discourse. Moreover, “imputed student 
costs” and “refugee costs”, although it is authorised 
to report these as ODA, are expenditures whose 
contribution to development is contested by some 
donors, parliamentarians and NGOs, who consider 
them too far removed from aid in the field. To ac-
curately identify what they contribute to recipient 
countries’ development, it would be necessary to 
calculate the proportion of students or refugees 
whose return to their country of origin (or capi-
tal transfers) is known or certain. However, this 
would require years of complex monitoring.
6.2. The main strategic 
challenges selected by 
France for its ODA financing 
only roughly reflect its 
official line of discourse
Comparing France’s discourse with its ODA allo-
cation choices reveals that “economic develop-
ment”, “protecting the environment and global 
public good” and “social justice” are, in that order, 
the three main challenges financed by France. 
Next, and in last place, comes “promoting peace, 
stability, human rights” (Figure 1).
47. This sector was treated in a specific way in the second 
part of the analysis.
48. Aid covering the first twelve months.
Figure 1. French ODA by major challenge (USD millions)
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It is therefore the “economic development” 
issue that received the most financing over the 
period 2011–2014, representing around 30% of 
ODA commitments. This issue fell behind “protect-
ing the environment and global public goods” in 
2015 but remained at a high level (USD 2 billion), 
equivalent to about 25% of French bilateral aid 
(Figure 2).
The predominance of “economic development” 
in ODA allocation choices is reflected in significant 
commitments in the road, rail or air transport sec-
tor (on average USD 1 billion over the period), the 
“production” sector (access to financing and bank-
ing services, development of agricultural activi-
ties), “energy distribution” (power transmission 
and distribution lines), and “urban development 
and management”, such as developing security of 
land tenure or supporting local authorities.49
Financing economic development through the 
growth of production capacities in the Global 
South, supporting businesses and growth is ul-
timately not very prominent in the allocation 
choices, despite a French discourse that aims to 
stimulate a business environment and develop 
the private sector (Framework Document for De-
velopment Cooperation, 2011). In decline since 
2013, French financing for economic development 
is channelled more towards public works: particu-
larly transport and energy distribution.
Next comes financing for protecting the envi-
ronment and global public goods, which focuses 
49. Remember that, in this category, sustainable environ-
mental, climate or biodiversity projects were classified 
under the “protecting the environment and global pub-
lic goods” challenge.
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on climate issues, including the climate, the en-
vironment, biodiversity, water and sanitation. Fi-
nancing in these areas has been growing sharply 
since 2013. The trend is in step with the French 
discourse as stated in the Framework Law (2014) 
relating to the policy for development and inter-
national solidarity, whose overall aim is to foster 
sustainable development in developing countries, 
with its four economic, social, environmental and 
cultural components. There is also the “stamp” 
of a Minister Delegate for Development from the 
Europe Ecologie Les Verts party from 2012 to 2014. 
The increasing commitments for financing global 
public goods confirm France’s hallmark in the 
2030 Agenda and corroborate the priority given to 
fighting climate change and the aim of increasing 
development projects’ climate “co-benefits”. There 
is also a linkage with the overarching goal of a 
“better controlled globalisation”.
Figure 2. Major issues excluding debt cancellation, 
refugees and tuition fees (% of bilateral ODA)
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Social justice includes education, health and 
gender equality. The large sums allotted to these 
areas (see Table 1) is explained by the amounts 
devoted to “imputed student costs” (costs allo-
cated to students from developing countries who 
are studying in France), and refugee costs (tem-
porary aid for refugees from developing countries 
who arrive in a donor country—for the first twelve 
months of their stay).
If imputed student costs and refugee costs are 
excluded, ODA financing commitments for the 
“social justice” challenge are halved. These com-
mitments represent around 10% of French bilat-
eral assistance and have fallen slightly since 2011 
(see Figure 2). These amounts do not reflect the 
French discourse in a totally convincing way: 
“France recalls the importance of lifelong educa-
tion and training in the development process and 
the core aspect of well-being and rights of individ-
uals and the best interests of children among the 
development goals” (Framework Law, 2014). 
Lastly, the proportion of assistance for peace, 
stability and the rule of law has been very low 
and has stabilised at around 2% since 2011 (Fig-
ure 2). The stated goal for this area does not match 
the disproportionately low financing commit-
ments, compared to the other issues.50
6.3. Issues reveal more 
about the instruments used 
than official discourse 
The evolution of the financing for the key areas 
encompassed by the French ODA discourse reveals 
France’s policy choices as much as its preferred 
instruments: the reduced amounts for “economic 
development” and “social justice” challenges as 
from 2013 can be explained by the decline in French 
commitments in the form of grants. The increase 
for “protecting the environment and global public 
goods” is due to the growing proportion of loans 
(Figures 3a, 3b, 3c).51
An analysis of the geographical distribution of 
the “strategic challenges”—whether for protection 
of the environment and global goods or economic 
development—shows that it is the middle-income 
countries that mainly benefit from French assis-
tance. This is consistent with the French discourse: 
with the majority of loans going to emerging coun-
tries. Although one can understand the interest of 
boosting the protection of the environment and 
global public goods in this country category—
which has a low dependence on ODA and where 
the donors’ added value hinges on the capacity to 
act on biodiversity, the environment and the fight 
against global warming—it is worth reflecting on 
the absence of a clear-cut discourse acknowledg-
ing the relevance of reinforcing “economic devel-
opment” in middle-income countries (Figure 4).
To sum up, the “economic development” chal-
lenge is to some extent the elephant in the room 
for French ODA: it accounts for a large proportion 
of commitments and relates to types of develop-
ment such as infrastructure or transport on the 
one hand, and the strengthening of the private 
sector on the other.
This result opens—or reopens—two major de-
bates. The first concerns the choice of countries 
to be assisted and how their financing needs are 
50. Remember that here we are only considering the bilat-
eral ODA flows.
51. Due to the lack of data, we were not able to include in 
our analysis the changes in financing through blended 
instruments or facilities.
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Table 1. French bilateral ODA by major challenge (USD millions)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Global public goods 512 731 1 082 1 751 2 444 1 414 2 490 854 2 032 3 047
Economic development 4 914 3 248 3 798 3 279 3 615 2 979 4 658 3 773 2 630 2 089
of which debt cancellation 3 889 1 707 1 222 1 645 1 477 1 251 1 475 1 055 30 139
Debt cancellation (%) 79% 53% 32% 50% 41% 42% 32% 28% 1% 7%
Social justice 2 747 2 951 3 055 3 069 3 098 3 030 2 746 2 790 2 617 2 139
of which imputed student costs & 
refugees in donor contries
1 594 1 581 1 289 1 306 1 437 1 517 1 498 1 478 1 512 1 159
imputed student costs & refugees (%) 58% 54% 42% 43% 46% 50% 55% 53% 58% 54%
Peace, stability, rule of low 128 149 182 173 243 304 187 230 229 177
Multisector 704 553 1 199 558 775 1 010 516 629 407 274
Administrative costs 330 352 412 441 439 468 493 515 548 470
Unallocated 108 243 148 75 380 285 293 124 607 477
Total 9 443 8 228 9 875 9 347 10 993 9 490 11 383 8 915 9 071 8 673
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Figure 4. Economic development: distribution by income 
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assessed (sectoral for DAC). The disparity be-
tween discourse and reality, while not gaping, is 
problematic for the readability of the French ODA 
“hallmark”.
Secondly, it is imperative to anticipate how the 
allocation of French ODA financing will be affect-
ed by the key challenges for developing countries 
between now and 2030, regarding the environ-
ment, security, stability, employment, training and 
social protection model. Clearly, there are some 
elements of discourse and financial commitments, 
but these lack coherence and are inadequate in 
scope.
In particular, spending on peace and stability re-
mains weak, as is, to a lesser extent, the amount 
allocated to “social justice”. However, these 
“strategic challenges” represent some of France’s 
strengths, as it has an undeniable expertise in cer-
tain areas—be it enhancing financial governance, 
mobilising tax resources, (public) education, pro-
tecting the environment or social protection. The 
2030 agenda is very broadly progressive, and con-
tinental Europe, including France, has managed to 
integrate its priorities into this agenda concerning 
rights and access to essential freedoms and servic-
es. Yet, there is still much to be done when it comes 
to discourse or the choices of aid allocation.
7. FINDINGS ON THE WEAKNESSES 
AND CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS 
FOR ODA BY 2030
7.1. The weaknesses revealed 
by the national narratives
Our reading of the national narratives shows that 
the Addis Ababa Agreement on development 
financing arrangements and the consensus around 
the goals expressed by the SDGs mask profound 
differences between the donors when it comes to 
the justification and the hallmarks of their ODA. 
Some of these differences are inevitable. The very 
fact of stamping your hallmark means that you 
have to distinguish it from that of your neigh-
bours. Besides, as the ODA is rooted in history as 
much if not more than in economic rationality, 
the motives, priorities and choices of allocation 
cannot be expected to be similar across countries. 
Nonetheless, both the ways of justifying aid and 
explaining its rationales, show more striking and 
explicit differences than we would have thought. 
And although some convergences between goals 
and modalities can be observed—conflict manage-
ment, poverty reduction, financing of global 
public goods—none of these bring the four donors 
together in such a way as to pave the way for 
remaining donors.
Were we to simplify the discourses and bring 
them closer together, we would end up with two 
narratives: one involves the United Kingdom and 
the BMGF, focused on absolute poverty in fragile 
States (though as seen in Section 4, the interven-
tions of BMGF are not limited to this). Here, ODA 
represents a flow that has no short-term equiva-
lent or, in other words, no possible substitute. The 
second, driven by continental Europe, foregrounds 
the various financial (loan, grants, guarantees) 
and non-financial cooperation contributions 
whose end goal is the construction of public poli-
cies crucial to managing globalisation. The case of 
Chinese assistance is apart and somewhat para-
doxical: it serves a political ambition (the eman-
cipation of former colonies) but its allocation does 
not seem to emanate from any centralised political 
strategy. 
Aside from BMGF (and to some extent the UK), 
the conditions for successful ODA external to aid 
itself. By 2030, aid will be dependent on policies 
or initiatives that do not fall under the heading of 
ODA, as we know it today. This is the case of exter-
nal policies (defence, provision of GPGs, trade, in-
stitutional reform to the UN and the IFIs, refugees 
and migrants), as well as domestic policies (agri-
culture, labour market, taxation), as Germany in 
particular highlights. Although this relationship 
has always existed to some degree, such depend-
ency will grow because of the 2030 Agenda and 
the fragile nature of contemporary discourse on 
ODA.
These discourses contain a few blind spots that 
need enlightening. These include the role that 
funding (ODA and non-ODA) plays in achieving 
the targeted goals, the sustainability of this fund-
ing if subscribed as debt, and the public/private 
sharing of responsibilities, especially when it 
comes to sharing risk. These blind spots are a sec-
ond factor of weakness in the discourses justifying 
ODA. 
Finally, we add a further point to the previous 
ones, which unlike these has not been deduced 
from our analysis of the discourses. In fact, the 
method chosen to inform the justifications for 
ODA in this study gives an exclusive role to donors 
and sidelines what the recipient countries or “part-
ners” themselves could produce on the matter. 
Aware of this bias, we believe that despite every-
thing, the 2030 Agenda currently under discussion 
is an agenda of financial offerings. What holds for 
this Agenda as a whole also holds for its Parties, 
as shown by the discussions at the Habitat III Con-
ference as these too were expressed exclusively 
through the vocabulary and prism of development 
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finance providers. This predominance of a dis-
course focusing on the “offering” stems from the 
accounting equation behind the Agenda’s stupen-
dous financing needs—the trillions to be found at 
all costs—whose terms date back to the first work 
of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts 
on Sustainable Development Financing. Vital to 
fixing the orders of magnitude, the estimations of 
aggregate needs have the disadvantage of hiding, 
for the moment, the emergence of national pref-
erences and the South’s narratives on the subject. 
This is a third weakness in the discourses on ODA. 
7.2. The conditions of 
success—an exploration 
First point to be clarified: the 2030 Agenda feeds 
the narratives on the supply of financing, but are 
there also narratives dealing with demand? At this 
stage, debates on finance for development focus 
on the toolbox of instruments to be deployed in 
response to the need for substantial investment in 
developing countries. This call for the deployment 
of diversified instrument is mainly driven by the 
supply, i.e., the donors. What knowledge of the 
“needs” do they base their offer on? How to better 
take them into account? What are the different 
visions of long-term transformation among 
different actors of change—politicians, investors, 
think tanks? What “transformation” exactly does 
or should ODA finance from the recipient coun-
tries’ point of view?
Second point to be clarified: what can external 
financing achieve in the contexts of fragile States, 
poor governance and conflict, which will certainly 
remain major challenges in 2030? In these situa-
tions, what exactly can be expected from the con-
centration of aid? What conditions outside of ODA 
need to be present for ODA to reach its objectives? 
Do the OECD and DfID to be given priority advo-
cate the “whole-of-government” approach? 
Third point to be clarified: do the macroeco-
nomics of the 2030 Agenda comply with the cur-
rent rules governing indebtedness?
Developing countries have to reconcile a dou-
ble objective: finance development spending and 
avoid a debt crisis. Are these two objectives com-
patible? Is the magnitude of the 2030’s Agenda fi-
nancing needs compatible with the current rules 
of indebtedness and the measures of risks and 
dividends? Do the central banks and IFIs have a 
special role to play that they have not played so 
far? Should debt be more flexible for investments 
in sustainable development objectives? Alterna-
tive (or complementary) measures to contracting 
debt involve collecting tax revenue, migrants’ re-
mittances, public-private partnerships—provid-
ing these are viable—and the reduction of illicit 
financial flows. Is the magnitude of the related 
needs, in line with the SDGs, known? What are 
the expected results of aid exactly? 
Fourth point to be clarified: building global pol-
icies—after ODA, what comes next? 
A number of global challenges—such as the tar-
get of keeping global warming down to 2°C or the 
fight against deepening inequalities—highlight 
that aid alone is far from sufficient for the achieve-
ment of the SDGs by 2030. Despite the many com-
mitments to promoting policy coherence since the 
beginning of this century, the results have fallen 
short of expectations: for many years, there has 
been a clear division of labour within governments 
whereby the ministries in charge of international 
development defended the interests of developing 
countries, while the other ministries worked to 
promote national growth (Carbonne, 2012). 
What are the reasons for the so far modest re-
sults of the donor’s efforts to improve policy 
coherence? 
Aside from the coherence of current policies, 
what failings or shortcomings in current govern-
ance need to be acted on? The financial architec-
ture? The global rules, so as to include provisions 
for taxation? In what way does ODA represent an 
asset, a promising experience, to “steer globalisa-
tion”? What pieces of the global governance puz-
zle need to be integrated into it so as to increase 
its impact? 
If the conditions of success for the 2030 Agenda 
do not depend on aid, how can (or must) the re-
sponsibilities of aid organisations be transferred 
to actors working in other areas of public policy 
impacting developing countries?
Fifth point to be clarified: Innovating, learning 
and going to scale; following the success in the do-
main of health, what comes next? Is there current 
consensus on some of the SDG priorities—know-
ing that the universal and integrated character 
of the Agenda rules out any notion of priority? 
Does the remarkable success of some of the health 
MDGs suggest other specific SDGs for which a 
global approach would be effective? ❚
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1 Table correlating the OECD sectors with France’s major challenges
110: I.1. Education, Total Social justice
120: I.2. Health, Total Social justice
130: I.3. Population policies/programmes and reproductive health, Total Social justice
140: I.4. Water and sanitation, Total Global public goods
150: I.5. Government and civil society, Total Peace, stability, rule of law
 16010: Social/welfare services Social justice
 16020: Employment policy and administrative management Social justice
 16030: Housing policy and administrative management Social justice
 16040: Low-cost housing Social justice
 16050: Multisector aid for basic social services Social justice
 16061: Culture and recreation Social justice
 16062: Statistical capacity building Economic development
 16063: Narcotics control Social justice
 16064: Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS Social justice
210: II.1. Transport and storage, Total Economic development
220: II.2. Communications, Total Economic development
  23110: Energy policy and administrative management Global public goods
  23181: Energy education/training Economic development
  23182: Energy research Economic development
  23183: Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency Global public goods
 232: Energy generation, renewable sources, Total Global public goods
 233: Energy generation, non-renewable sources, Total Economic development
 235: Nuclear energy electric power plants, Total Economic development
 236: Heating, cooling and energy distribution, Total Economic development
 236: Heating, cooling and energy distribution, Total Global public goods
240: II.4. Banking and financial services, Total Economic development
250: II.5. Business and other services, Total Economic development
300: III. Production sectors, Total Economic development
410: IV.1. General environmental protection, Total Global public goods
  43010: Multisector aid Multisector
  43030: Urban development and management Economic development
  43030: Urban development and management Global public goods
  43040: Rural development Economic development
  43040: Rural development Global public goods
  43050 Non-agricultural alternative development Economic development
  43081: Multisector education/training Social justice
  43082: Research/scientific institutions Multisector
510: VI.1. General budget support, Total Multisector
520: VI.2. Developmental food aid/Food security assistance, Total Social justice
530: VI.3. Other commodity assistance, Total Economic development
600: VII. Action relating to debt, Total Economic development
700: VIII. Humanitarian aid, Total Peace, stability, rule of law
910: Administrative costs of donors, Total Administrative costs
930: Refugees in donor countries, Total Social justice
998: IX. Unallocated/Unspecified, Total Unallocated
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